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Abstract
A recent wave of economic research has studied the transformation of China
from a poor country in the 1970s to a middle-income economy today. Based on this
literature we discuss the factors driving Chinas development process. We provide
a historical account of Chinas rise, fall, and resurgence. We then discuss the
stylized facts associated with Chinas growth process and review a comprehensive
theory of its economic transition. Finally, we discuss Chinas future. In particular,
we review some recent studies about technological and politico-economic factors
that may foster or hinder its future economic performance.
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1 Introduction
China is today one of the world's most powerful nations. China's population of 1.36
billion exceeds that of high-income nations altogether, and the country is today the
world's second largest economy and the largest exporter.1 However, until the late 1970s,
China was a very poor and closed country, with an income per capita of just 4% of the
US level. The process of economic reform, which started in the 1980s and accelerated
in the 1990s, catapulted China into a trajectory of stellar growth. Over the rst decade
of the 21st Century, China's (PPP-adjusted) GDP per capita grew at an annual 9:5%
rate. The resulting reduction in poverty is equally impressive: the fraction of the Chinese
population living in extreme poverty plummeted from 84% in 1981 to 13% in 2008.2 Such
a rapid improvement in living conditions for such a large share of the world population
is unprecedented in history. But while China is much richer today than it was thirty
years ago, its level of economic development is still low, with an income per capita of
about 20% of the US GDP per capita.
As the Middle Kingdom has gained in economic importance, it has attracted an
increasing attention from the economic profession. Understanding the driving forces
behind the most signicant growth miracle in history is indeed a rst-order issue. Yet,
China remains largely understudied. The number of studies on China published in
general interest journals is still very small relative the number of those focusing on the
US (or other industrialized countries). This is largely due to conservatism and inertia in
the profession. However, this will change in the coming years. In our view, the interest
in understanding China's great economic transformation will remain strong and be more
resilient than interest in other current issues such as the Great Recession.
In this review we address three related questions: (i) Why was China so poor in the
1The US, Western and Central Europe, Japan, and other Western oshoots altogether have a pop-
ulation of ca. 1 billion.
2Using the denition of the World Bank, i.e., those living with less than $1:25 daily).
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1970s?, (ii) Why was growth so rapid after 1979? and (iii) What factors can sustain and
what can jeopardize the future growth of China? We will not provide comprehensive
answers to these big questions. Instead, we will highlight some selected issues we regard
as salient and fruitful for further economics research.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2, we review China's historical devel-
opment during the second millennium. In section 3, we discuss the stylized facts on the
transition of China towards a market economy and lay out a theoretical framework that
captures these observations. In section 4 we discuss issues related to the future economic
development of China. Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical background
2.1 From world technological leadership to poverty
Between 1000 and 1500 AD, China was the most technologically advanced region world-
wide. Prosperity stretched from the Song period (960{1279) to the commercial develop-
ment under the Ming dynasty (1368{1644), when sea explorations led Chinese traders
all the way to the coasts of Africa (Levathes 1994). During this period China introduced
many important inventions that would become known in Europe centuries later. The
so-called four great inventions { printing, gunpowder, paper making and the compass {
were only some of the major innovations introduced during the Song period or earlier
(Needham 1981; Shaer 1986; Lin 1995). Under that same dynasty, the central adminis-
tration started issuing paper money, well ahead of Europe. As long-distance trade with
Europe developed in the 16th century, China exported technology-intensive goods in
exchange for silver and primary commodities (Wong 1998). The demographic evolution
kept pace with the general prosperity: by 1100 the Chinese population rose to over 100
million, reaching 160 million at the time of the Ming dynasty (Fairbank & Goldman
2006, p.128).
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After the Ming splendor, power was seized by the Qing dynasty (1644 to 1912 AD)
- native of Manchuria. It took the new rulers about four decades to conquer the whole
country and to crush the Ming resistance. The conict plunged the country into a
severe economic downturn. Yet, China recovered, and by the end of the 17th century
the economy was ourishing again. According to Pomeranz (2000, 2001), the living
standards in the Yangtzi delta region { the richest part the country { were, in the
second half of the 18th century, comparable to those of the most advanced European
regions.3
The British industrial revolution was the landmark of the great divergence. Hostile
to Western inuence, the imperial government imposed heavy barriers to the commercial
relationships with Europe.4 The ensuing conict with the Western colonial powers led
to a sequence of wars ending in military defeats for China (e.g., the Opium Wars of
1839-1842 and 1856-1860). In turn, these undermined severely the legitimacy of the
imperial government. Unrest erupted, most notably the Taiping Rebellion, an outright
civil war, which brought the Manchurian rulers to confront surging Han nationalism
between 1851 and 1864 (Platt 2012). The revolt ended in bloodshed. Between 20 and
30 million people are estimated to have died as the army repressed the revolt with the
help of the French and English armies.
China benetted, as did Britain, from important technological improvements in agri-
culture preceding the industrial revolution. The control of river oods caused a surge in
food production, which in turn induced a demographic boom: between 1680 and 1820,
the population tripled. However, unlike in the West, progress in agriculture did not pave
the way to industrialization and urbanization. In Britain these improvements preluded
the breakdown of the Malthusian equilibrium. Fertility started to decline and income
3Other economic historians challenge this nding, arguing that living standards in the richest Chinese
city { Beijing { were already below those of London and Amsterdam, although comparable to cities
such as Leipzig and Milan in the 18th century (Allen et al. 2011).
4An example is the restriction of foreign trade to the port of Canton, subject to high duties (see
Krieger et al. 1990 and Wong 2004 for a dierent interpretation of these restrictions).
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per capita to grow. China, in contrast, remained a rural country, with a stagnating
income per capita.5
This great divergence accelerated when Chinese political institutions collapsed in the
early 20th century. A revolution in 1911 led to the proclamation of the republic under
the presidency of Sun Yatsen. However, the new state was weak and precipitated into a
period of wars and anarchy.
In 1949, after the end of the Sino-Japanese war and the communist uprising, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded under the leadership of Mao Zedong,
chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP thereafter). The PRC was a vastly
impoverished country, dominated by traditional subsistence activities. From 1951 and
onward, industry and agriculture were collectivized. Dissatised with the slow speed of
progress, Mao launched in 1956 the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" inviting intellectuals
and ordinary people to voice their open criticism of the Party's policies and bureaucracy.
This window for open debate was soon closed, and replaced by the call for a "Great Leap
Forward", an ambitious (and improvised) plan intended to turn the PRC into a modern
industrial collectivized country. Its implementation contributed to the ensuing famine
that killed about 30 million people (Meng et al. 2010). After an ephemeral reform-
oriented stage under the aegis of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (1962{64) a new wave
of radicalism erupted with the start of the "Cultural Revolution", which was supposed to
cleanse the society of capitalism and traditional Chinese values. During this tormented
period, Liu Shaoqi was jailed and died in prison, while Deng Xiaoping fell into disgrace.
After Mao's death in 1976 and the liquidation of the "Gang of Four" { a group of leftist
party ocials, including Mao's wife { Deng Xiaoping became the de-facto leader of the
CCP. He quickly repudiated the Cultural Revolution , and in 1978 launched a program
of pragmatic economic reforms whose primary goal was to increase the persistent low
5For dierent interpretations of the divergence between China and Europe, see, e.g., Pomeranz (2000)
and Voigtlander & Voth (2013).
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productivity in agriculture.6
2.2 The 1980s: experimenting with economic reforms
After thirty years of central planning, the PRC adopted gradually a set of market-
oriented reforms. Land collectivization was replaced by the principle of "household re-
sponsibility" in agriculture, while the role of local governments was enhanced by the
creation of township and villages enterprises. The government experimented with a new
industrial policy granting a special status to a few selected Special Economic Zones
(SEZ). The decade marked the start of a rapid structural transformation from agricul-
ture to industry and services: between 1978 and 2003 the employment share of agricul-
ture fell from over 70 percent to less than 50 percent (Dekle & Vandenbroucke 2012;
Cao & Birchenall 2013).
SEZ were especially important. They opened a hitherto isolated economy to foreign
investments and the associated ow of technical knowledge. Initially, four SEZ were
established: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in the Guangdong Province and Xiamen
in the Fujian Province. The success of the experiment led to a progressive expansion
of Chinese industrial policy: in 1984 fourteen cities in the East Coast, and later two
provinces and three delta areas became SEZ. Then, in 1992, 1998 and 2005 the SEZ
status was extended to inland cities; rst capitals, then median cities.
In a recent empirical study, Alder et al. (2013) (henceforth, ASZ) assess the eects
of SEZ on economic development. The establishment of SEZ introduced well-dened
changes to the legal framework which were staggered over time and space.7 ASZ exploit
this variation in a panel of 276 Chinese cities at the prefecture level over the period 1988-
6The pragmatic attitude of Deng Xiaoping is captured by his quote: "I don't care if it's a white cat
or a black cat. It's a good cat so long as it catches mice." He is said to have made this statement during
the 1961 Great Famine, speaking in favor of partial decollectivization of land so as to raise agricultural
production (Li 1994, p.376).
7SEZ received preferential treatment in terms of tax deduction, custom duty deduction, reduced
land-use price, and exibility in labor and nancial contracts.
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2010 to estimate, by a dierence-in-dierence method, the eect of the policy treatment.8
The control group are cities in the same province and year that have not (or not yet)
received the SEZ status. They nd that introducing a SEZ increases the city's GDP per
capita by 20% in the long run.9 Figure 1 displays the average treatment eect of SEZ
on GDP per capita before and after the establishment of a SEZ.
Figure 1 about here.
One might be concerned that the government's choice of SEZ location is not ran-
dom. For example, the central government may have selected cities based on some prior
knowledge (e.g., proximity to ports, and thus potential for success). Indeed, in the
1980s, SEZ were selected on the coast and close to Hong Kong and Taiwan. To address
this selection issue ASZ restrict the analysis to a subsample of treated cities located in
inland provinces where the assignment was based on administrative criteria (e.g., being
a provincial capital). The eects for this subsample are similar to the rest. Moreover,
Figure 1 shows that there are no dierential trends prior to reforms.
The evidence in ASZ suggests that the industrial policy was eective in promoting
economic development. The quantitative eects of SEZ on city development are size-
able, but not huge relative to the high total growth rates of this period, suggesting that
the eects of the policies might have spread relatively quickly to neighboring regions.
Even beyond its direct economic eects, the SEZ experiment made a signicant con-
tribution. It strengthened the condence of the political leadership that opening the
8Earlier studies document cross-sectional growth dierences between cities hosting SEZ and other
cities include Wei (1993), Demurger et al. (2002), and Jones et al. (2003). Jin Wang (2013) shows that
SEZ increased the foreign direct investment ow.
9ASZ estimate the following regression:
yipt = i + t;p +
JFX
n= JB
nI
n
itf(t Reformyeari) = ng+Xit + "it;
where t Reformyeari measures leads and lags of the reform year in city i. The regression controls
for city xed eects i (to lter out time invariant heterogeneity), province-time xed eects t;p (to
control for time varying heterogeneity at the provincial level) and other city characteristics Xit.
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Chinese economy to markets and trade was essential to achieve industrialization and
economic development. Two decades after the rst SEZ were established, the develop-
ment strategy of the political leadership still echoes the positive experience of the SEZ:
on September 29, 2013, the government launched the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, with an
emphasis on nancial liberalization. We shall return to this recent development below.
In summary, the 1980s was an important decade of experimentation in economic
reform. Development took o as productivity in agriculture soared and domestic and
foreign investments poured into the SEZ. Nevertheless, most of the country remained
subject to a centralized planning system. By the end of the decade, growth slowed
down and popular discontent grew as widespread corruption within the political elite
was exposed. Street demonstrations after the death of the reformist leader Hu Jaobang
in 1987 were followed two years later by the student protest, violently repressed, in
Tiananmen Square. Divisions fermented within the CCP as its conservative faction
challenged the whole process of economic reform.
2.3 The 1990s: China becomes a market economy
The early 1990s was marked by great uncertainty. Eventually, the pro-reform faction
won, and the reform process resumed. The turning point was Deng Xiaoping's "South-
ern Tour" of 1992 { a series of informal speeches laying out the Party's new course
and gathering support for deeper economic reforms that would transform China irre-
versibly (Zhao 1993). In 1992, the Shanghai Stock Exchange re-opened. State-owned
enterprises (SOE thereafter) were subjected to market competition with inecient and
unprotable entities forced to either restructure or shut down. Many SOE were priva-
tized or formed joint ventures with foreign rms. Wholly private enterprises owned by
Chinese entrepreneurs were created and received the ocial blessing of the CCP in 1997.
China embraced a process of export-led growth, culminating in accession to the World
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Trade Organization in 2001.
It is often argued that the growth in the 1990s was largely investment-driven. In-
deed, investment rates were sustained at a very high level, well over 30%. However,
the economic transformation went far beyond mere capital accumulation: it brought
about major shifts in the sectoral composition of output, urbanization, and a growing
importance of markets, technological change and entrepreneurial skills. Without these
changes, it would have been impossible for the rate of return on investments to remain so
high over such a long period.10 If part of this success can be explained by the adoption
of new technologies from existing rms, reallocation has been a key driver of the growth
process. For instance, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck & Zhang (2012) document that up to
two-thirds of the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in manufacturing
was due to selection, i.e., high-productivity rms entering and low productivity exiting
the market.
The lion's share of this reallocation process is the exit of low-productivity state-owned
enterprises (SOE) and their replacement with new domestic private enterprises (DPE,
henceforth). Figure 2 shows the private employment share in manufacturing, mining and
construction, including both domestic private enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises.
In 1994, private enterprises accounted for about 10% of total employment. By 2007, their
share exceeded 50%. SOE are, on average, less productive than DPE. Song et al. (2011,
henceforth, SSZ) report a dierence of nine percentage points in protability between
DPE and SOE, measured by the ratio between total prots ("operation prots plus
subsidies plus investment returns") and value of xed assets net of depreciation. Similar
results emerge from TFP accounting studies such as Brandt et al. (2008), Brandt & Zhu
(2010) and Brandt, Tombe & Zhu (2012). Hsieh & Klenow (2009) estimate a measure
of revenue-TFP gap between DPE and SOE to be 42%. In summary, the process of
10China's rate of return on capital has remained well above 20%, higher than in most industrialized
and developing economies. Bai et al. (2006, Figure 11) show that the rate of return on investment in
the manufacturing sector has increased since the early 1990s.
10
reallocation is related intimately to the progressive privatization of the Chinese economy.
Figure 2 about here.
Another salient feature of the Chinese transition is the moderate wage growth. The
average real annual growth of wages in the urban manufacturing sector was 7.6% from
1992 to 2007, whereas the average growth rate in the urban real GDP per capita during
the same period was above 10% (Ge & Yang 2013). Moreover, part of the measured
wage growth stems from a composition eect as the share of educated workers has risen.
There also evidence of a falling labor share of aggregate output, from 50% in 1992 to
41% in 2005 (Bai et al. 2006, Table 1). The relatively low wage growth, combined with
a thriving class of entrepreneurs, has contributed to the rising inequality in China.
Finally, an important aspect of the Chinese growth experience are pervasive credit
and nancial market imperfections, as documented, e.g., by Allen et al. (2005) and
Song & Wu (2011). A symptom of these imperfections is the large gap between high
corporate returns and very low returns on savings: the average real rate of return on
bank deposits, the main nancial investment of Chinese households, was close to zero.
Firms are credit constrained, and private rms more so than SOE. This discrimination
is reected in the fact that SOE nance a substantially larger share of new investments
through external channels (see SSZ). Moreover, Dollar & Wei (2007) document survey
evidence that private rms must often resort to retained earnings and family and/or
friends to nance investments. Long & Zhang (2011) provide evidence that private
rms benet more than do state-owned rms from industrial clusters, as these facilitate
inter-rm trade credit easing their need of external nancing. The diculty for DPE
to nance investments is reected also in the choice of production techniques. In 2006
the average capital-output ratio in SOE was 1.75 vs. 0.67 in DPE, while the capital per
worker was almost ve times larger in SOE than in DPE. This dierence has both an
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intensive and an extensive margin. SSZ document that SOE are more capital-intensive
within three-digit manufacturing industries. Moreover, DPE specialize in labor-intensive
industries, while SOE still dominate capital-intensive industries.
3 Growing like China
In this section, we present a model that captures the salient features of China's transition
into a market economy, outlined above. The model is based on SSZ.
3.1 A theory of economic transition
Both the neoclassical and the endogenous growth literature developed in the 1990s focus
on a representative rm and study its incentives to accumulate capital and technical
knowledge (see, e.g., Aghion & Howitt 1992). In the analysis of developing economies,
growth theory focuses on the imitation and adoption of more advanced technologies
already in use in other countries (Acemoglu et al. 2006). The lag in technology adoption
determines the TFP gap across countries.
A recent literature argues, however, that low aggregate total factor productivity
(TFP) { especially in developing countries { can arise from rm-level misallocation (see,
e.g., Restuccia & Rogerson 2008, Gancia & Zilibotti 2009, and Hsieh & Klenow 2009).
Although some rms have a high productivity, they fail to attract large shares of produc-
tive resources, due to nancial frictions and other wedges. These wedges keep inecient
rms alive, reducing average productivity. Hsieh & Klenow (2009) show that reallocation
within the manufacturing sector has been an important driver of productivity growth in
China, accounting for an annual 1.4 percentage point increase in aggregate TFP during
1998-2005.
SSZ provides a framework for analyzing the growth eects of a large initial misalloca-
tion that is removed gradually over time (as in Lewis 1954). The building blocks of the
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theory are rm heterogeneity in productivity and nancial market imperfections. There
are two types of rms: Entrepreneurial E-rms have a higher TFP, and are operated by
agents with entrepreneurial skills who are nancially constrained; Financially integrated
F-rms have a lower TFP but have good access to credit markets. In particular, the
latter can borrow at the world interest rate, assumed to be constant. In the Chinese
case, E-rms and F-rms capture DPE and SOE, respectively. In addition to nancial
frictions, we introduce a labor wedge implying that labor costs may dier across the
two types of rms. Before economic reforms, such a wedge is large, implying that there
is no employment in E-rms. The economic reforms reduce this wedge, triggering the
onset of privatization. Absent credit market frictions, F-rms would be instantaneously
crowded out by the more productive E-rms. However, F-rms temporarily survive, due
to their better access to credit markets. Over time, the self-nanced E-rms outgrow
the F-rms, progressively reducing their employment share. During this transition, the
average rate of return to capital and TFP increase due to reallocation.
More formally, the technologies operated by F-rms and E-rms are described by
the following production functions:
yFt = k

Ft (AtnFt)
1  ; and yEt = kEt (AtnEt)
1  :
k and n denote the capital and labor input, respectively.  > 1 reects the better
governance of E-rms.11 At is a TFP parameter that evolves according to an exogenous
law of motion: At+1 = (1 + z)At:
F-rms can borrow from banks at the gross rate Rl. Prot maximization implies that
Rl equals the marginal product of capital in F-rms, and that wages equal the marginal
product of labor,
11See SEZ for microfoundations. The weak corporate governance of SOE is well documented; see
Chang & Wong (2004), and Liu & Otsuka (2004).
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wt = (1  )
 
Rl
 
1 
At: (1)
E-rms must hire a manager to run the rm. His compensation, mt, is subject
to a standard "no stealing" incentive-compatibility constraint requiring that, for some
 2 (0; 1) ; mt   yEt. Subject to some parameter restriction, this constraint is binding
in equilibrium. Thus, the value of a rm endowed with capital kEt is the solution to the
following program:
t (kEt) = max
nEt

(1   ) (kEt) (AtnEt)1   mt   (1 + !)wtnEt	 ; (2)
where ! is a labor market wedge faced by private rms. ! > 0 may reect subsidies
to F-rms or costly regulations that aect only E-rms (where the complete ban on
domestic private rms prior to the 1990s would correspond to ! ! 1). In contrast, a
negative wedge can arise if E-rms can avoid some costs (e.g., by evading payroll taxes
or contributions to the pension system).
Taking the First Order Condition with respect to nE and substituting in the equi-
librium wage given by (1) implies that employment in E-rms is linear in their capital
stock,
nEt =

1   
1 + !

 1
  
Rl
  1
1  kEt
At
: (3)
This in turn implies the rate of return to capital invested in E-rms is constant, E 
(1   )1= (= (1 + !))(1 )=Rl, and that the value of the rm is proportional to the
capital stock, t (kEt) = EkEt. Note that the rm-level results also hold at the aggregate
level.
Banks collect savings from households and invest in domestic capital and foreign
bonds yielding a gross return R. We assume a stark nancial friction: banks do not lend
to E-rms (in SSZ, E-rms can borrow to nance investments, but only up to a limit).
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An arbitrage condition implies that the rate of return on domestic investments equals
the rate of return on foreign bonds. Moreover, assuming for simplicity a competitive
banking sector yields Rd = Rl = R where Rd is the return on deposits.
The household sector is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived
agents who work when young and live o savings when old. Preferences are parameter-
ized by a standard logarithmic utility function, Ut = log (c1t) +  log (c2t+1) ; where  is
the discount factor. Each agent saves a fraction = (1 + ) of her rst-period income.
Agents have heterogeneous skills. Each cohort consists of a measure Nt of agents
with no entrepreneurial skills (workers), and a measure  of agents with entrepreneurial
skills (entrepreneurs). Skilled agents can be hired as managers when young and invest
in E-rm capital when old. The population of workers grows at the exogenous rate ;
where  captures demographic trends, including migration from rural to urban areas.
Consider the young households' portfolio choice. Workers face no interesting choice,
and deposit their savings with banks, earning the interest rate Rd. Young managers can
invest their savings either in bank deposits or in E-rm capital. Since there is no risk,
they invest all their savings in the rm if and only if E > R
d. This occurs if and only if

1 + !
>

1
1   
 1
1 
: (4)
This is a necessary condition for economic transition to take o. Conditional on  and
 ; the transition requires that the wedge ! be suciently low.
Suppose, rst, that condition (4) fails to hold. An extreme example is China before
the start of economic reforms, when private employment contracts are forbidden. Then,
the economy is in a steady state where all workers are employed in F-rms and produc-
tivity grows at the exogenous rate z: Next, assume that ! falls, due to economic reforms,
so that condition (4) is satised.12 The policy change triggers a transition where skilled
12For the transition to take o, one more condition must be met, namely that the entrepreneurs
must have enough initial capital that the wage of managers exceeds that of workers. In our model, the
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agents set up E-rms and hire workers and managers, and capital starts accumulating
in the E-rm sector.
The transitional equilibrium is analyzed more formally in SSZ, where it is shown
that, given KEt and At, the equilibrium dynamics of total capital and employment
among E-rms during transition are given, respectively, by KEt+1=KEt = 1 +  and
NEt+1=NEt = (1 + ) = (1 + z) ; where
1 +  =

1 + 
 
1   
E

: (5)
In order for E-rms' share to grow over the transition, it is necessary that (1 + ) = (1 + z) >
1+: The speed of transition is increasing in  and  and is decreasing in !: Intuitively,
a high propensity to save for the entrepreneurs yields high investments in E-rms, speed-
ing up the transition. So does a higher TFP in E-rms. The wedge ! has the opposite
eect.
Figure 3 illustrates the transitional dynamics of the economy in SSZ. During the
transition, the E-rms' employment share grows. Once all workers are employed in
E-rms, the transition ends (period T in the gure). E-rms have a higher rate of
return and less capital per worker than do F-rms. The within-rm rates of return on
capital remain constant, but the average rate of return on capital increases due to a
composition eect. The growth of GDP per worker increases during the transition, due
to the reallocation of capital and labor towards more productive rms. The wage rate
grows at the rate z, so the wage per eective unit of labor remains constant.
Figure 3 about here.
number of rms is indeterminate. We can therefore assume that skilled agents can (if necessary) pool
their savings so as to form a rm that is suciently large that m > w. Alternatively, the initial capital
can come from the privatization of some SOE.
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These observations are consistent with the stylized facts described in section 2 above.
In particular, the employment share of DPE has been increasing (cf. Figure 2), the rate
of return on capital in manufacturing has been increasing, the wage growth has been sig-
nicantly lower than output growth, and DPE have a higher return and a less capital per
worker than SOE. In addition, output growth increases during the transition, consistent
with the empirical pattern for China, and then eventually declines. Interestingly, there
are current signs of a growth slowdown, accompanied by a reduction in the reallocation
of workers from SOE to DPE (see again Figure 2).
An implication of the theory is that liberalization reforms that relax asymmetric
nancial constraints can foster the growth of private rms and speed up transition.
Fan & Kalemli-Ozcan (2014) provide empirical support for this prediction. They study
the eects of nancial reforms on rm-level investments in a panel of Asian emerging
economies including China, using a dierence-in-dierence approach. They nd that
nancial liberalization reduces the savings and increase the investments of private rms
relative to those of state-owned rms. This is consistent with the premise of the theory
above that private rms are subject to tighter nancial constraints. Reforms relaxing
such constraints reduce the need for private rms to retain earnings in order to fund
their investments, and increase their investment potential.13
Finally, the model predicts increasing inequality and a declining labor share. In the
pre-reform economy, the labor share of output equals 1   , whereas at the end of the
transition it is equal to (1   ) (1  ). While wages grow at the rate z; signicantly
below the average growth rate in the economy, managerial compensations grow at rate
 > z during the transition: a new middle class of entrepreneurs thrives.
In the theory outlined above, the transition is ignited by the change in the employ-
ment wedge in the private sector, !. What were these policy changes that triggered
13Their ndings suggest that asymmetric nancial frictions are pervasive in East-Asian economies be-
yond China. SSZ document that, in this respect, the development of China is similar to the experiences
of Korea and Taiwan.
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growth? The success of the reform process cannot be attributed to one policy mea-
sure alone. As discussed in section 2, the industrial policy based on special economic
zones may have been important. However, the size of ASZ's estimated eects suggests
that this cannot have been the only factor at work. A complementary theory is that a
change in the system of incentives within the ruling CCP created conditions conducive
for growth. Jia (2012) provides evidence that in the 1990s, economic growth became the
single most important criterion for political careers within the CCP. We return to her
study in section 4.
3.2 Zhuada Fangxiao
The model outlined above captures salient aspects of economic transition in China.
However, the stark prediction that SOE disappear altogether is not fully borne out in
the data (cf. Figure 2). Indeed, the strategy laid out by the Ninth Five Year plan
in 1997 was not to aim for a privatization of all sectors of the economy, but, rather,
to retain a strong state presence in some key sectors, and to rationalize the system of
SOE. The slogan was "Grab the large and release the small rm" (Zhuada Fangxiao).
In the data, we see that the role of SOE has declined substantially in many sectors,
especially labor intensive ones, but remains dominant in other sectors, especially the
capital-intensive industries (e.g., electrical and heating power or transport equipment).
In these industries, the government promoted the merger and restructuring of SOE into
large transregional groups. Moreover, there is evidence of rising prots (and wages) in
surviving SOE. Hsieh & Song (2013) show that the TFP growth of surviving SOE has
been high and even greater than that of DPE (although a large productivity gap in favor
of DPE persists).
SSZ provides two complementary explanations for these developments. First, a mul-
tisector extension of the model where some sectors are more capital-intensive than others
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shows that market forces drive SOE out of business more quickly in labor-intensive indus-
tries, whereas SOE are more resilient in capital-intensive industries. Intuitively, the SOE
access to external nancing gives them a comparative advantage in capital-intensive ac-
tivities. Second, if SOE are granted monopoly power in specic industries, they will not
only remain dominant in those industries, but also benet from the increased eciency
of the rest of the manufacturing industries when these are liberalized.
We illustrate the monopoly story here. Consider the following extension of the model
above. Assume the nal good, Yt; to be a CES aggregate of two intermediate goods:
Yt =

' (Y ct )
 1
 + (Y mt )
 1

 
 1
: (6)
Initially, both Y c and Y m are produced by F-rms. Then, economic reforms liberalize
production in the Y c sector (which becomes competitive) { which can be interpreted
as a reduction in ! in this sector. However, no reform takes place in the Y m sector {
i.e., SOE retain monopoly in this sector. Over time, DPE take over the competitive
sector, according to the mechanism of the general model outlined above. SSZ (section
IV, Proposition 2) show that the optimal markup charged by the monopolist SOE (and,
hence, their prots) is increasing in the share of E-rms in the competitive industry.
Intuitively, as the productivity of the competitive sector increases during the transi-
tion, so does the demand for the monopolized good, which increases the prots of the
monopolist.
Interestingly, the model predicts a non-monotonic behavior SOE in terms of prof-
itability. Before the reform, both sectors are monopolized by the SOE. Then, as sector c
gets exposed to competition from private rms, the SOE in the competitive sector stop
making prots. In this stage, the average performance of SOE deteriorates. Eventually,
as DPE crowd out the SOE from the competitive sector, the average performance of
surviving SOE improves again. The reason is that the vast majority of the surviving
19
SOE are now in the monopolized sector, and in addition, as discussed above, prots in
this sector are large due to the high eciency attained by the other sector.
A complementary theory along similar lines was developed recently by Li et al.
(2012). They assume a vertical structure where SOE monopolize upstream industries,
whereas the downstream industries are competitive. Similar to the mechanism in SSZ
discussed above, the rents of the upstream SOE increase due to the liberalization of the
downstream sectors. They interpret the model economy as one of "state capitalism".
While SSZ assume that labor markets are competitive, so all rms pay equal wages,
there is evidence that SOE pay on average higher wages for workers of given qualication.
Moreover, the gap has increased over time, according to Ge & Yang (2013). It would
be simple to extend the model to allow for ex-post rent sharing (e.g., through Nash
bargaining) between workers and rms in the monopolized sector. Such a model predicts
that as the prots of surviving SOE grow, so do the wages paid by these rms. Another
reason why SOE may decide to grant part of the rents to their workers may be political
motives, i.e., the desire to create a base of support for the government elite. We will
return to this argument below.
Finally, there is evidence that surviving SOE have managed to become more ecient.
As mentioned above, Hsieh & Song (2013) document that the TFP grew faster in SOE
than in private rms during 1998-2007 (see also Liu & Cao 2011). This is partly the result
of improvements in the management of surviving SOE, and part of positive selection:
the least productive (typically, small) SOE have exited the market or have been forced to
merge or restructure, whereas the most productive (typically, large) SOE have survived.
Improvements in SOE have been quantitatively sizeable. Hsieh & Song (2013) perform
a counterfactual experiment where the TFP growth of all incumbent SOE is shut down,
internal distortions (in particular, labor distortions) are set equal to the 1997 levels for
all incumbent SOE, and all SOE that have exited are resurrected. The result is that
total industrial output would be 42 percent lower.
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3.3 The foreign surplus
A feature of the Chinese experience during the last two decades is that high growth has
been accompanied by the accumulation of a large foreign surplus. Its foreign reserves
swelled from $21 billion in 1992 (5% of its GDP) to $3500 billion in June 2013 (over
40% of its GDP), see Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here.
The recent literature has noted the regularity that many emerging economies have
a large foreign surplus in spite of higher return on investments in the rest of the world.
Gourinchas & Jeanne (2013) show that, on average, countries with fast TFP growth
have large trade surpluses and capital outows, while countries with a low TFP growth
have trade decits and capital inows. They label this nding as the \allocation puzzle",
since it runs against the predictions of the standard neoclassical theory.
While China is by no means unique, the foreign surplus of China has drawn far
greater public attention than the surplus of other countries, due to its large weight in
the world economy. A concern is that cheap Chinese exports harm domestic rms and
cause job losses in the West, in line with the evidence for the US by Autor et al. (2013).14
A popular argument is that trade surpluses are engineered by the Chinese government
through a systematic exchange rate manipulation, i.e., by pegging the RMB to the dollar
at a low value. This view has dubious foundations. While the Chinese surplus has
persisted for almost two decades, after a period of mild depreciation, the real exchange
rate has been appreciating since 2003 (see Song et al. 2014). A misaligned exchange rate
should feed domestic ination, e.g., by increasing the demand of non-traded goods and
stimulating domestic wage pressure. However, until very recently it does not appear as
14Note that this eect is partially oset by more jobs being ceated in export-oriented industries.
Dauth et al. (2012) nd that the positive employment eect dominates in Germany.
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if China has experienced any major inationary pressure { between 1997 and 2007 the
ination rate was on average about the same as in the US. Reisen (2010) shows that the
RMB was not signicantly undervalued in real terms in 2008, once one lters out the
Balassa-Samuelson eect. We conclude that the control of the nominal exchange rate is
an unlikely rst-order cause of the persistent imbalance.
SSZ provides an alternative, structural explanation for the imbalance. The starting
point is the macroeconomics identity according to which the trade surplus equals the
gap between domestic savings and investments. China experienced large investment
rates, but even larger saving rates. Since 1997 domestic savings have exceeded domestic
investments (as a share of GDP). It is useful to decompose the savings gap between the
household, corporate, and government sectors, see Figure 5. As expected, households are
net suppliers of savings, while rms demand external resources to nance investments.
The net position of the households follows a non-monotonic pattern. In contrast, the
net demand of external funds from rms, i.e., corporate investments minus savings, has
been declining sharply as a share of the GDP since 1992. The government played a less
important role in accounting for the aggregate savings gap.
Figure 5 about here.
In SSZ, a rising foreign surplus is caused by the fact that DPE borrow less from
banks. As their growth crowds out SOE during the transition, the banks become awash
in cash and must invest in foreign bonds. To see this mechanism more formally, consider
the banks' balance sheets in the simplied version of SSZ outlined above. Let B denote
banks' purchases of foreign bonds, and let KF denote the loans to F-rms. Since F-rms
are entirely bank-nanced, this is also the investment level of F-rms. Bank deposits
equal the savings of the workers. Savings and investments of E-rms do not feature in
the banks' balance sheets, since managers do not hold deposits, nor do banks make loans
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to E-rms. Hence, equating banks' assets and liabilities yields:
KFt +Bt| {z }
assets
=

1 + 
wt 1Nt 1| {z }
deposits
: (7)
As the employment share of F-rms declines during the transition, the demand for loans
to nance their investments falls too. This reduces the total demand for funds from
local investors, since E-rms are borrowing constrained. However, workers' wages are
unaected by the transition, so aggregate deposits do not depend on the share of E-rms
during the transition. Consequently, banks must shift their portfolios towards foreign
bonds (B) causing a growing foreign surplus (see panel 5 of Figure 3). In the model, the
accumulation of reserves can be viewed as a growing gap between banks' deposits and
loans to domestic agents. This is precisely what we see in the data (see Figure 4), where
the growing gap between deposits and loans tracks closely the accumulation of foreign
reserves.15
This mechanism is reminiscent of the empirical pattern of corporate demand for
external funds (i.e., investments minus savings) in Figure 5, which is an updated version
of Figure 2 in Yang (2012). As the transition progresses, internally nanced DPE replace
externally nanced SOE, shrinking the gap between corporate investments and savings,
consistent with Figure 5.16 The theory is also consistent the pattern of allocation of
savings and investment across regions in China. SSZ (Table 1, p. 207) document that
the gap between savings and investment is positively correlated the private employment
share in manufacturing, which in turn is positively correlated with productivity growth.
15SSZ also predicts a rising aggregate saving rate (see panel 6 of Figure 3). The reason is that the
young { who are the net savers { acquire over time a larger share of aggregate income: the old capture
a share  of the income of F-rms and a share  (1   ) of the income of the E-rms, and the income
share of E-rms grows over time.
16Empirically, a signicant part of the investments of SOE is internally nanced, while in the model
the SOE have no retained earnings. What matters for the model to be consistent with the evidence is
that SOE nance a larger share of their investments through external loans than do the DPE. This is
true empirically; see Figure 4, p. 210, in SSZ).
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Thus, a version of Gourinchas and Jeanne's (2013) allocation puzzle holds across Chinese
regions. The ndings are conrmed by the more formal analysis in Cudre (2013), who
nds that provinces with faster TFP growth have higher investment wedges (hence,
lower investments) and lower saving wedges (hence, higher saving).17
In the theory outlined above the foreign surplus is caused by the inability of under-
developed nancial markets to channel savings to highly protable domestic investment
opportunities. For related mechanisms, see Buera & Shin (2009), Sandri (2010), Angele-
tos & Panousi (2011), and Matsuyama (2012). These contributions are related to recent
theories of global imbalances emphasizing the shortage of assets in emerging economies
with high saving rates. These include Bernanke (2005), Caballero et al. (2008), Mendoza
et al. (2009) and Gourinchas & Rey (2013). They emphasize that nancial markets in
emerging economies are underdeveloped and fail to oer savers assets that provide risk
sharing and stores of value.
Global imbalances reect nancial ows. Gourinchas & Rey (2013) show that these
ows are much larger than ows of foreign direct investments (FDI) to and from emerging
economies. This is true also for China (Song et al. 2014). One potential reason is that
there are tight controls on cross-border portfolio investments. Holmes et al. (2013)
propose a complementary mechanism. They document that China is pursuing a quid
pro quo policy of granting market access in exchange for gaining access to know-how and
technology that Chinese rms can build on. Such an exchange could increase competition
down the road for a potential investor, and this makes Western rms reluctant to do
FDI in China. Holmes et al. (2013) argue that this policy can explain why the gross
FDI ows to China are so small.
17See also Cudre and Homan (2013) for a more detailed analysis of the determinants of net exports
for Chinese provinces.
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3.4 The savings puzzle
China's massive foreign surplus points to another puzzling aspects of China's transfor-
mation: its huge propensity to save. The aggregate saving rate has been above 35% of
GDP since the 1980s, and has risen further after 2000, exceeding 50% in recent years
(see, e.g., Horioka & Wan 2007, Ma & Yi 2010, and Yang 2012). Household savings as
a fraction of disposable income has increased from 16% in 1990 to over 30% nowadays.
Standard theories emphasizing consumption smoothing would, in contrast, predict that
China should have low and decreasing savings rates. Why have Chinese households
saved so much, given the fast income growth observed since the 1980s?
Chamon & Prasad (2010) and Song & Yang (2012) document an additional puzzling
aspect of household savings in China. The younger and older households have higher
savings rates than do the middle-aged households, so the age prole of savings rates is
U-shaped.18 This is a unique feature of China even relative to other developing countries.
Moreover, it contradicts the standard life-cycle model, where savings are large for middle
aged and small for young and old households (Modigliani & Cao 2004), given a standard
increasing age-earnings prole.
The high saving rate of Chinese households and the anomalous age prole associated
with it have attracted a lot of recent research. Here we review some of the studies.
Chamon & Prasad (2010) document a large increase in saving rates for all cohorts and
age groups. Thus, a composition eect arising from a changing age structure is unlikely
to have played an important role. Instead, the rise in savings must be due to factors
associated with the transition to a capitalist economy. They argue that a key driver of
high savings is the shifting burden of health and education expenditures from the state
to individuals, a change that has induced young households to save for their children's
18The ndings that savings rates are falling with age for younger households is challenged by Coeur-
dacier et al. (2013) who argue that it may reect an aggregation bias associated with the presence of
multi-generational households. For instance, the saving rate of middle-aged household heads may be
underestimated if they co-habit with younger adults or elderly who have lower savings.
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education, and elderly households to save for retirement and health care needs. The
end of the so-called "iron rice bowl" had a particularly large eect on the savings of the
generations more directly aected by the reforms - i.e. those who were in their 40s and
50s in 1990. Finally, Chamon & Prasad (2010) argue that the large-scale privatization
of residential houses, which triggered an increase in the ownership rate from 17% in 1990
to 86% in 2005, played an important role. The reform increased house prices and the
number of potential buyers (see Wang 2011; Liu et al. 2013). Given the downpayment
constraints and nancial frictions, the savings increased.19
The precautionary motive argument implies that savings rates should increase with
income uncertainty. Fang et al. (2010) show (based on the methodology of Storeslet-
ten et al. 2004) that Chinese households face more severe persistent risk than do US
households, and hence save more. A concern with an explanation based solely on pre-
cautionary motives, however, is that while household saving rose sharply after 2000 (cf.
Figure 5), it is dicult to point to a large empirical increase in individual risk during
this period. For instance, pensions coverage increased over that decade.
Song & Yang (2012) argue that the increase in the saving rate, and in particular
the U-shaped age-prole of savings, can be accounted for by technological factors. They
document that the growth rate of the entry wage across cohorts has been higher than
the average wage growth in China, whereas the age-prole of earnings has become atter
for later cohorts. The life-cycle model implies that young agents should save more when
the age-earning prole is less steep. Using a quantitative multi-period OLG model, they
show that this mechanism can account for an increase of about 10 percentage points in
the average saving rate. Their mechanism can also explain the increase in the saving
rate observed for the 25{45 age group over the period 1992{2007.
An important policy change that may have aected saving behavior is the sequence
19Using the Urban Household Survey, Brugiavini et al. (2013) document that the savings rate of
households who bought a house after 1998 at market price was signicantly higher than that of the rest
of the population. See also Wang & Wen (2010).
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of family planning policies introduced in the 1970s, culminating with the 1979 one-child
policy. This policy imposes draconian sanctions on urban couples who have more than
one child and rural couples who have more than two children { with exemptions for
special groups and ethnic minorities. As a consequence, the total fertility rate (TFR)
fell sharply. For instance, in urban areas, the number of surviving children fell from 3.2
in 1970 to less than 1.3 in 1982. Banerjee et al. (2013), Choukhmane et al. (2013)
and Zhou (2013) argue that the policy's introduction may have increased savings since
it reduced the number of children who can potentially provide old-age transfers when
parents retire.
Banerjee et al. (2013) focus on the savings of retirees over 65, using data from the
China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS). They estimate the eect
of family planning policies by exploiting the earlier policies introduced in 1972 under
Chairman Mao, which encouraged an increase in birth spacing of three to four years.
Even though these policies did not literally restrict the number of children ever born to
a woman, these policies had a large negative eect on the number of children per woman
because the subsequent introduction of the 1979 one-child policy came as a surprise. The
parents who in 1979 had planned to have many children but had delayed the timing of
the births in compliance with the spacing policy, were unexpectedly barred from having
more children. The authors nd that parents who had their rst child after 1972 (the
treatment group) have, on average, signicantly fewer children than those who had their
rst child before 1972 (the control group). The reduction in the number of children is
smaller for parents in the treatment group whose rst child was a son { likely due to the
fact that many parents who already had a son, decided voluntarily not to have a second
child, so the policy had a weaker eect on this subgroup. As far as savings are concerned,
Banerjee et al. (2013) nd that on average families in the treatment group have a saving
rate 5.7 percentage-points higher than parents in the control group. The dierence is
almost entirely accounted for by families whose rst child is a daughter born in 1972 or
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later. For these families saving rates increased by 9.7 percentage-points, whereas there
is no signicant eect of the 1972 family planning policies on families whose rst child is
a son. They interpret this nding as related to the Chinese tradition that sons provide
more support to elder parents than do daughters. Thus, the policy had its strongest
eect on the savings of families who had a daughter and were unexpectedly barred from
having another child. These couples could not expect much help from their child, and
therefore save more during retirement.
Choukhmane et al. (2013) study the eects of the one-child policy exploiting data
from the Urban Household Survey. They compare the savings rates of households who
had twins after the introduction of the one-child policy with those of households without
twins. Having twins is not subject to legal sanctions, and is a credible source of exogenous
variation. Households with twins had between 3.5 and 8.5 percentage points lower saving
rates than households without twins, depending on the sample and the denition of
consumption. In their data sample, children are still residing with their parents. Thus,
as the authors acknowledge, part of the eect arises from a pure expenditure channel:
consumption increases when there are more mouths to feed.
Zhou (2013) focuses on the savings of the children. She documents that single chil-
dren have signicantly higher saving rates than do children with brothers. She argues
that this is due to siblings, and especially brothers, providing implicit risk sharing and
potential for sharing the future burden of elderly care for their parents. Thus, by reduc-
ing the number of siblings the one-child policy increased the savings of young households.
Looking at a dierent channel, Wei & Zhang (2011) argue that the increase in savings
is related to the growing sex imbalance at birth. The sex ratio { i.e., the number of men
per woman { has risen dramatically over the last three decades in China, from 106 boys
for 100 girls in 1980 to 120 boys per 100 girls in 2005. This is due to the joint eects
of the one-child policy, the traditional preference for a male ospring, and the access
to selective abortion technology. These changes stiened the competition among boys
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in the marriage market. Wei & Zhang (2011) argue that, in response, households with
a son will increase their savings in order to make their boys more competitive in the
marriage market. In support of this theory, they document that households with a son
have a higher average propensity to save than households with a daughter. Moreover, the
savings of households with a son increased more in regions with a greater sex imbalance.
Finally, saving rates tend to be higher in regions and years with a greater local sex
imbalance.
The studies reviewed above suggest that demographic changes can be important for
savings. However, changes in fertility may have dierent eects on savings at dierent
stages of the life cycle (see, e.g., Ge et al. 2012). Due to data limitations, we do not
yet know how the one-child policy will eventually aect savings for all age groups. In
addition, the regression studies can uncover only partial equilibrium eects. Banerjee et
al. (2013) show that a general equilibrium eect through the interest rate can mitigate
signicantly the partial equilibrium eect of fertility restrictions on saving rates.
4 The future of China
What does the future bode? A common view in the West is that China's growth trajec-
tory is unsustainable, due to the persistence of a non-democratic institutional framework,
dierent from those that promoted prosperity in the West (see Acemoglu & Robinson
2012). The extractive Chinese institutions can possibly sustain catch-up at an early
stage of development, but will eventually become a burden. According to this view,
China will not escape an institution-driven "middle-income trap". Others argue that
China's hybrid form of "state capitalism" can become a successful new model of economic
growth, possibly exportable to other developing nations (Musacchio & Lazzarini 2012).
Due of the lack of historical precedents, this debate is necessarily speculative. In light
of the recent economic literature, this section reviews factors inuencing China's future
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economic development. We start with some impetuses, then discuss some obstacles.
4.1 Impetus for sustained growth
First, the mere adoption of technologies already in use abroad is likely to be a powerful
engine of growth for at least another decade. China is still a relatively poor country,
with an average productivity of rms and workers far below that of industrialized na-
tions. Therefore, the potential for technological catch-up is still enormous. To draw a
comparison, in 2010 the GDP per capita of Russia was more than twice that of China
(source Penn World Table 7.1). Given the current rates of TFP growth and fast technol-
ogy adoption, it seems unlikely that China's institutions could prevent it from reaching
Russia's current level of development.
Second, China is being transformed into an innovation-oriented economy. Foreign
direct investments have been a major driver of technology transfer (see Acemoglu et
al. 2012). In addition, China has also invested large resources to develop a strong
local innovation capability, which Holmes et al. (2013) view as complementary to the
foreign technologies transfer via FDI. The R&D investment share of GDP has increased
steeply, from 0.7% in the 1990s to 1.84% in 2011 (OECD Science, Technology and R&D
Statistics 2012). Today's gure is close to the average for the European Union (1.94%),
albeit still lower than that of the United States (2.77%). China has already surpassed
rich economies such as Canada, Italy, Spain and the UK, and spends substantially more
than do other emerging economies. The comparison is even more impressive if one
restricts attention to industry-related R&D investments: China invests 1.36% compared
with 1.66% of the US and 1.02% of the EU. China employs 820,000 researchers working
in business enterprises, while the US employs 1.1 million of them. Finally, looking
at the number of patents in 2011, the Chinese patent oce granted 172,000 patents,
compared with 225,000 and 152,000 patents granted respectively by the US Patent and
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Trademark Oce and the European Patent Oce (source: World Intellectual Property
Organization).20
Interestingly, while China's growth has been so far largely export-led, the recent
boom in innovation appears to be increasingly driven by the expansion of the domestic
market. Beerli et al. (2013) document that a massive change in domestic demand is
taking place as Chinese households are lifted out of poverty and a rapidly growing mid-
dle class can aord to spend on durable consumer goods. The expected growth of the
future domestic demand (which varies across dierent durable goods) is shown to be a
signicant determinant of innovation at the rm level after controlling for potential en-
dogeneity issues. Their results are consistent with the predictions of models of directed
technical change (see, e.g., Acemoglu & Zilibotti 2001, Gancia & Zilibotti 2009), aug-
mented with non-homothetic preferences (Boppart & Weiss 2013). According to these
models the growth in market size related to changes in income levels and distribution
should predict the direction of R&D investments.
In summary, China is a very innovative economy, far ahead any other country at a
comparable development stage. Economic theories arguing the case for middle-income
traps (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2006) emphasize the inability for countries with rigid
institutions to promote a transition from an investment-driven to an innovation-driven
growth. There is no evidence indicating that China is heading towards a low-innovation
equilibrium.
Third, China is making large human capital investments. The average years of
education in the population over 25 is now 7.5, twice as high as in 1980 (Barro & Lee
2012). Assuming a rate of return to education of, say, 10% per year, this increase in
educational attainment implies an increase in average labor productivity of 43% due to
human capital accumulation alone. The increase in the proportion of the population
20In 2011, the number of applications led in China was actually higher than the number of applica-
tions led to both the EU and the US patent oces. This suggests that inventions patented in China
might be of a lower quality. See Bussy (2013) for more discussion.
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with some tertiary education is even faster: 6% today against 1% in 1980. The current
enrolment rate in tertiary education (27%, according to World Bank 2013) implies steep
increases in future educational attainment. The boom in higher education is a recent
phenomenon: between 1979 and 1995, tertiary school enrollment rates were below 2.5%,
and the increasing shortage of high-skill workers was reected in a rapid rise in the return
to education.21 This trend was followed by a rapid expansion in higher education during
the last decade, bringing the number of fresh college graduates from less than a million
in 2001 to over six million in 2010 (Heckman & Yi 2012). This was accompanied by a
booming number of students studying overseas: Chinese students represent today 18.2%
of all international students enrolled in OECD countries (OECD 2011). Changes in
the quantity of education likely underestimate the actual human capital accumulation.
During pre-reform times, schools at all levels emphasized ideological learning. In 2009,
Shanghai came out as the leader in the PISA study, outperforming by a wide margin
Western countries. Interestingly, Shanghai students' scores were far less correlated with
their socioeconomic background than in OECD countries. Thus, schools appear to be a
vehicle of social mobility in China.
Human capital accumulation, investments in technology adoption and industrial poli-
cies (such as SEZ) have come hand in hand with an increasing technology intensity of
industrial production. Wang &Wei (2010) document that over the last decade China has
become increasingly less specialized in labor-intensive and low-value added industries,
shifting its production and export structure towards high-tech sectors.
Finally, an important, yet largely unexploited potential source of future growth is
the reduction of the pervasive nancial frictions. In section 3 we argued that these
are responsible for severe misallocations. We believe that reforms aimed at reducing
the market power of the large state banks, for instance by allowing banks to compete
21The growth rate of wages of college graduates was 240% between 1992 and 2007 compared with
135% for workers with middle school and below (Ge & Yang 2013).
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in oering deposit and lending rates (so far heavily regulated), and at improving the
legal system (contract enforcement, investor protection, etc.) can have large eects on
productivity. The opening of the capital account and the convertibility of the RMB,
currently under discussion, are an opportunity for such reforms.
An important rst step in this strategy is the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ),
launched in September 2013 under the impetus of Li Keqiang's government. The goal
of the SFTZ is to become a test ground for nancial reforms and to accelerate the
capital convertibility and full liberalization of the nancial service industry. While many
important details about the regulation of the SFTZ are yet unclear, there are reasons
to believe that this initiative may become a stepping stone in the process of nancial
reform. The special policies applying to the zone are expected to be full interest rate
liberalization, convertibility of the RMB (even for non trade-related transactions), free
entry of foreign banks, and permission for domestic banks to provide o-shore nancial
services. In addition, there will be neither control nor taris on goods entering the SFTZ
from abroad, and free circulation of goods within the zone, although strict controls will
apply to the ow of goods between the SFTZ to the rest of mainland China. However,
there are reasons to believe that the rigid insulation of the zone may be relaxed in
future. The fact that other cities in China such as like Tianjin and Chongqing have
oered to host similar FTZ suggests the possibility that nancial liberalization will
undergo a gradual expansion following the model of the industrial policy (SEZ) of the
1980s discussed above.
4.2 Obstacles and challenges to sustained growth
Despite China's potential promise, there are looming issues that could potentially stall
the reform process and threaten the future economic development. We discuss here four
salient factors: the rising economic inequality; the aging population; the environmental
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toll of rapid economic growth and its negative impact on quality of life; and the fragility
of the political equilibrium.
4.2.1 Inequality and aging
Economic inequality and the aging of the population are perhaps the most acute chal-
lenges to social cohesion and the status quo in China. Fast growth has been accompanied
by a rapid increase of income inequality. Starting poor but equal, China has evolved into
a highly unequal society. The Gini coecient of income has risen from 0.36 in 1992 to
0.47 in 2012 (source: CIA World factbook), roughly comparable to that of the US, and
much higher than that of any Western European country. The top 10% income share
rose from 19% to 28% between 1990 and 2003 (source: World Top Income Database).
The sources of increasing inequality are manifold: age (i.e., younger cohorts are much
richer than older ones), education, dispersion across regions and between rural and ur-
ban areas, resident and non-resident workers, capitalists and workers, etc. To the extent
that a continued reform process { the status quo { requires social cohesion, the growing
disparities pose a real risk. In absolute terms, growth has benetted both the rich and
the poor. As discussed above, the poverty rates have fallen dramatically after 1980.
Over the same period, life expectancy has risen by approximately 10 percentage points,
reaching 74 years in 2011. But while growth has benetted the Chinese population over-
all, inequality may pose a threat to social cohesion, and has become increasingly salient
in the discourse of the political leadership. In a press conference held on March 14, 2012
the former premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao declared:
I know that social inequities...have caused the dissatisfaction of the masses.
We must push forward the work on promoting social equity... The rst issue
is the overall development of the reform of the income distribution system.
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The looming aging of the population is another such critical issue. The total de-
pendency ratio has fallen from 75% in 1975 to just 37% in 2010. This is due to the
combination of high fertility in the 1960's { when China's total fertility rate (TFR,
henceforth) was between ve and six { and the family planning policies introduced in
the 1970s, culminating with the one-child policy. As a result, a very large share of the
Chinese population is of working age today. The expanding share of working people
has contributed to economic growth in the two past decades. However, China has now
reached a turning point: the old-age dependency ratio will increase from the current
12% to 39% in 2040. The trend is likely to continue well beyond 2040, since the current
TFR (estimated to be around 1.6, see Yi 2007) is below the replacement level. Even if
the one-child policy were relaxed, it is unclear to what extent this would increase the
TFR, at least in urban areas. For instance, other emerging economies that are today
richer than China, such as Brazil and Russia, have low TFR (equal to 1.8 and 1,7, re-
spectively). Regions culturally similar to mainland China, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Macau and Singapore have TFR of 1.2 or lower.
Some commentators warn that an aging population might harm economic growth,
pointing to the experience of Japan: future saving rates may decline (though this is
unlikely to be a major issue for China); the society may turn less forward-looking and
innovative; and, most importantly, the government's future tax base and, hence, its
ability to nance social policies, will be compromised. Thus, an aging population will
make it increasingly dicult to mitigate China's income disparities.
In no setting is the dual challenge of inequality and aging more evident than in
China's pension system. Historically, pension systems have been a powerful vehicle of
intergenerational redistribution in Western economies, and this "social contract" has
been a force for social cohesion. Its introduction bailed out the unlucky generations
that were hit by the Great Depression and World War II. Arguably, a similar case can
be made for the current elderly Chinese workers who were impoverished by the tragic
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experiences of the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, intergenerational
inequality is a very important part of total inequality in China. Due to high growth,
the present value of earnings for a worker entering the labor force in 2000 is, on average,
about six times as large as that of a worker who entered in 1970 (Song et al. 2012,
henceforth SSWZ). Poverty among the elderly is a major social issue, especially in rural
areas (see, e.g., Yang & Chen 2010, and Almas & Johnsen 2012). One might object
that the elderly can be bailed out by their own children. However, the traditional family
insurance system relying on transfers and support from children (especially, sons) is
under strain, due to the smaller number of children, increasing geographic mobility, and
the decline of traditional values (see, e.g., Cai et al. 2006; Park et al. 2012). In this
context, pension transfers seem critical for mitigating inequality and poverty.
4.2.2 Sharing the benets of growth: the role of pension reform
Given these issues, it is natural that the pension system is a key policy issue for China.
We now review China's current pension system, and then analyze how it should be
changed, in light of our preceding discussion on inequality and aging.
China has an urban pension system, originally introduced in 1986 and then reformed
in 1997. Rural residents earn no pensions, although a limited rural pension system has
been introduced recently. Prior to 1986, urban rms were committed to paying pensions
to their retired employees. This system ceased to be viable in a market economy with
rm- and worker turnover. The 1986 reform transferred responsibility for pensions to
local municipalities. However, private rms were typically evading contributions, and
many urban workers did not accumulate pension rights. Municipalities came under
nancial distress and had to be bailed out by the central government. The 1997 reform
reduced the generosity of pensions, and strengthened the enforcement of contribution.
Subsequently, the coverage of the system has now risen from 44% in 1992 to over 60%
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today. However, the current system is not nancially sustainable. SSWZ nd that given
the demographic outlook of China, the present value of the future contributions falls
short of the present value of the promised pension payments. They estimate that if one
were to achieve sustainability by adjusting the replacement rate as of 2013, a permanent
cut from the current 60% to 40% would be required.
There are several alternative ways to make the pension system sustainable, each
involving a dierent extent of intergenerational redistribution. SSWZ study the welfare
implications of a range of sustainable pension reforms, assuming that the economy rst
goes through a period of fast wage growth (transition), and then experiences a slowdown
(steady state). To evaluate welfare consequences of intergenerational redistribution, they
introduce a planner who cares about all present and future generations, discounting the
future generations' utilities geometrically. The planner has two conicting objectives: to
minimize tax distortions, and to achieve the desired intergenerational redistribution. The
weight on these two objectives depends on the social discount rate: the more forward-
looking the planner, the lower her drive to redistribute consumption towards the earlier
generations.
With the aid of a calibrated multiperiod version of the model of section 3, augmented
with endogenous labor supply, SSWZ analyze the welfare eects of a variety of nancially
sustainable reforms, including a fully funded reform that eliminates any intergenerational
transfer (and tax distortions), and a pure pay-as-you-go system.22 They nd that even
a planner with an annual social discount rate as low as 0:5% would strictly prefer the
pay-as-you-go reform to a fully funded reform, or to a sustainable immediate reduction
in the pension benets.23 The reason is that the pay-as-you-go system delivers generous
22In a pure pay-as-you-go system, retirees receive a replacement rate that depends on the size of the
cohort of retirees and on the size and productivity of the cohorts of workers. Given the age pyramid of
China, a pure pay-as-you-go system benets retirees and workers retiring in the next few years, due to
the high wage growth and the low dependency ratio.
23This planner is an interesting benchmark since, given the calibration in SSWZ, she prefers no
intergenerational redistribution in steady state. The reason is that, with this particular social discount
rate, she would like a consumption growth between generations equal to the steady-state wage growth.
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pensions (in excess of the current 60% replacement rate) over the next thirty years, due
to the demographic structure characterized by a low old-age dependency ratio. Even
though the future generations receive very low pensions, these generations have very high
wages and can save for their old age. Thus, the social planner is satised with a system
of intergenerational transfers that shifts resources away from them in order to bail out
the initial generations of poor workers. Interestingly, the result hinges on the forecast
that Chinese wages will continue to grow for some time (according to the forecasts of
SSWZ, wage growth will exceed an annual 5% until 2030, excluding the eect of human
capital accumulation). If wage growth were constant at a 2% annual rate, the planner
would instead prefer to switch to a fully funded system.
These normative predictions run against the popular argument that reforming the
pension system in a pre-funded direction is the appropriate response for emerging economies
with an aging population (see, e.g., Feldstein 1999; Feldstein & Liebman 2006; and Dun-
away & Arora 2007). They are instead broadly in line with the policy recommendations
of Barr & Diamond (2008).
The study of SSWZ provides a rationale for using a temporarily unbalanced pension
system to bail out the poor generations that are currently middle-aged and older. This
can be a vehicle of social cohesion in China, especially if it is extended to cover all
Chinese citizens.24 Carrying out an immediate scal consolidation of the pension system
would require substantial government savings today to nance future transfers. Given
the large wealth that China has already amassed (e.g., in the form of foreign reserves),
this does not seem a top priority. To the opposite, this wealth could be used to nance
policies and institutions aimed at reducing inequality and making the growth process
However, the rst generation is exceptionally poor, so absent a pension system its consumption would
be lower than that desired by the planner.
24SSWZ analyze the costs and benets of turning the Chinese pension system into a universal system,
pooling all Chinese workers and retirees { in both rural and urban areas { into a system with common
rules. They nd that this could lead to large welfare gains, at only a modest cost for the future
generations.
38
more inclusive. As China develops, the citizens' demand for more extensive welfare
policies is likely to grow. A large share of citizens, such as the rural and the non-
resident migrant population, can be expected to want access to social insurance from
which they have been largely excluded in the past. There is, in our view, an urgent
need for more quantitative work evaluating the costs and the benets of social reforms
in order to attain an ecient institutional design.
4.2.3 The environmental disaster: pollution for promotion
One of the big open questions for China is the bias of its growth process towards quantity
relative to quality. Environmental degradation casts a shadow over China. Kahn and
Yardley (New York Times 2007) write: "Chinese cities often seem wrapped in a toxic gray
shroud. Only 1 percent of the country's 560 million city dwellers breathe air considered
safe by the European Union". Medium-size cities such as Linfen and Tianying lead
the sad ranking of the most polluted cities worldwide, due to coal and heavy metals
contamination, respectively. Water pollution is an equally severe problem (Shapiro
2012). China relies on dirty technologies to a larger extent than do other countries of
a similar development level (Vennemo et al. 2009). Why has the problem grown so
rampant?
According to Jia (2012) the answer is the system of promotion incentives within the
CCP that induces local political leaders to disregard environmental considerations in
order to achieve maximum growth. The promotion of provincial governors wishing to
climb the Party's hierarchy ladder hinges on the growth performance of their province.
This inhibits politicians from taking or enforcing measures that would limit the use of
cheap polluting technologies.
To investigate the question more formally, Jia builds a model whose main prediction
is that if a provincial governor stands a serious chance of promotion, he will disregard
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environmental concerns. The theory implies that if a local leader acquires a previously
non-existing political connection with a senior politician that enhances his career oppor-
tunity, his region will experience an increase in both the use of dirty technologies and
economic growth.25 She tests this theory by focusing on the connections between provin-
cial governors and members of the Politburo Standing Committee, who are responsible
for the promotion of provincial governors to higher positions within the CCP. To avoid
endogeneity issues, she assumes that a governor is connected to a Standing Commit-
tee member whenever they either were work colleagues, studied at the same university,
or originate from the same province. Such contacts occur early, and are not aected
by subsequent steps in the political career. She estimates how the performance at the
provincial level changes when a politician to which the provincial leader is connected
ascends to the Politburo Standing Committee. She nds that when a governor becomes
connected, industrial growth increases in his province relative to the rest of China. How-
ever, the environmental toll is heavy: both water contamination from industrial waste
and air pollutant emissions increase, respectively, by about 25% and 10%.
Jia's ndings support the hypothesis that career concerns can help explain why China
is so heavily polluted today. This suggests that political reforms should focus not only
on passing new laws and nancing programs to stop the environmental degradation, but
also on changing the informal rules and incentives within the CCP { establishing good
environmental standards as an explicit measure of political success. Another implication
is that a more environmentally balanced approach may require some sacrice in terms
of growth rates. If such policy changes can avert environmental disasters, they may
improve welfare for millions of people.
25There is a growing empirical literature studying the career incentives of Chinese provincial lead-
ers Persson & Zhuravskaya (2013) study the eects of the social ties between provincial leaders and
provincial elites on governance. Jia et al. (2013) study the complementarity between connections and
performance.
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4.2.4 State capitalism and political reforms
Political incentives also are at the core of another topical question: Will economic growth
bring about democratization or will the current political system be resilient to changes?
If so, will political distortions curtail economic development?
In a recent paper, Yikai Wang (2013) addresses these important questions with the
aid of a theory where a self-interested political elite controls state-owned rms and can
impose taxes on private rms. To stay in power the elite must shore up sucient po-
litical support to avert a democratic revolution (as in Acemoglu & Robinson 2005). It
achieves this goal through a divide-and-rule strategy that involves distorting the eco-
nomic equilibrium so as to grant sucient privileges to its supporters.
Wang derives conditions under which the economic transition will eventually trigger
democratization. When these conditions fail, the elite retains power perpetually, and
continues to impose distortions to the economic allocation that may eventually harm
economic development.
He formalizes the argument with the aid of a two-sector growth model along the
lines of SSZ (reviewed in section 3). The novel feature is that the political elite owns
the capital stock of F-rms, and extracts a surplus by taxing the more productive E-
rms owned by middle-class entrepreneurs. To avert a democratic revolution, the elite
must secure the support of a suciently large share of workers. To this aim, it creates
a dual labor market, where the F-rm workers are paid a wage premium and become
the base of support of the political system. In contrast, the wage paid by E-rms is
competitive. Under democracy, the median voter (i.e., the workers) taxes all rms and
redistributes the revenue as lump-sum transfers. To avert a revolution the elite must
satisfy two constraints: a minimum share  of the workers must be employed by F-rms,
and these workers must earn a wage in excess of what they would earn under a transition
to full democracy: wFt  wdemt , where wdemt is the equilibrium wage (including transfers)
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under democracy. There is no guarantee that a non-democratic equilibrium exists. For
instance, if the productivity or the share of total capital of F-rms is too low relative to
that of E-rms, the elite becomes unable to satisfy both constraints and must concede
democratization.
Figure 6 about here.
Figure 6 illustrates the case of a non-democratic equilibrium for a given private and
public capital stock. Employment in state-owned F-rms is measured on the horizontal
axis from left to right, while employment in E-rms is measured from right to left.
The two schedules represent, respectively, the marginal product of labor in F-rms
(downward sloping curve), and in E-rms (upward sloping curve). The undistorted
competitive equilibrium yields employment LFD in F-rms and a common wage rate w
D.
This allocation cannot be an equilibrium under non-democracy, since workers would
then support a revolution. The non-democratic equilibrium yields instead wF = wdem
and LFND  L.
The theory is consistent with the puzzling observation that the middle class { often
regarded as the driving force of democratization in the development process { appears to
support the non-democratic system. In Wang's model, the non-democratic equilibrium
appeals to the workers in the state sector, and also to the entrepreneurs who, due to
the labor market distortion, can hire workers at a lower wage. The sole losers are
the E-rms workers who earn lower wages (wE) than under democracy and receive no
transfers. The prediction of the theory conforms with the evidence in Chen & Lu (2011),
who document that state sector employees on average are less supportive of democratic
values. Interestingly, employment status (state or private sector) is a stronger predictor
of the attitude towards democracy than is party membership. Also consistent with the
theory, Ge & Yang (2013) document the existence of a signicant wage premium for
observationally equivalent workers employed in the state sector.
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Capital accumulation in the private sector has two opposite eects for the elite: on
the one hand, it increases the revenue of E-rms and the tax base from which the elite can
extract a surplus. On the other hand, as the hiring potential of private rms increases,
it threatens the political employment constraint LFND  L.26 Thus, while partial
privatization initially is welcome by the elite, when the E-sector becomes suciently
large, the elite has an incentive to curtail private employment and to increase F-rm
investments. One such policy is to impose tight credit constraints on E-rms, so as to
slow down their growth and give a signicant advantage to F-rms in the credit market.
Thus, the theory provides a rationale for strategic distortions of nancial markets, such
as those documented in section 3. It also provides a rationale for increasing investments
(again, for strategic reasons) in the state sector as the private sector grows, consistent
with the evidence of Hsieh & Song (2013).
At an early stage of the transition process, state capitalism speeds up growth by
suppressing wages and favoring private sector growth. However, at later stages, survival
of the regime requires distortions to sustain sucient SOE employment. In some cases
this can lock the economy in a middle-income trap. In other cases the equilibrium
features a serendipitous transition to democracy.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have reviewed some of the central issues in the recent economic de-
velopment of China. We emphasize, with the aid of a model, the transitional nature
of China's growth process over the last three decades. China now faces a dilemma:
the scope for growth driven by reallocation, along the lines of the model in section 3,
is diminishing, making future growth more dependent on local innovation and human
26In terms of Figure 6, suppose that the E-rm (upward sloping) schedule is shifted to the left. Then,
it may become impossible for E-rms to satisfy simultaneously the two constraints wF  wdem and
LFND  L. Thus, if the share of the capital stock of E-rms is too large, the elite cannot retain power.
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capital. Due to its large investments in R&D and education, China is likely to get a soft
landing. While growth may slow down, we see no indication that China will get stuck
in a middle-income trap. Still, the current model of state capitalism relies on impor-
tant distortions. It is an open question whether the political elite has the incentives to
overcome such ineciencies and complete the reform process (e.g., a further reduction
of the state's role in economic activity), as this may trigger an increase in the demand
for political changes. In the future, fostering social cohesion and averting environmental
disasters will be critical policy issues.
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Figure 1: The gure shows the average treatment eect of SEZ on GDP per capita over
time (from Alder et al. 2013) . The bars are estimates of leads and lags of the reform
eects (n). The solid and dashed lines show the condence intervals. Standard errors
are clustered at the city levels. See footnote 9 for details.
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Figure 2: The gure shows the private share of employment in manufacturing in China.
Two measures are plotted: First, DPE employment as a share of SOE+DPE employ-
ment, i.e., excluding foreign enterprises (FE) and collective enterprises. Second, the
combined employment in DPE and FE as a share of total manufacturing employment.
Source: NBS, 1998-2011.
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Figure 3: The gure shows the equilibrium dynamics of key variables in Song et al.
(2011). T denotes the end of the transition, when all workers are in E-rms.
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Figure 4: The gure shows China's foreign reserves (solid line) and the domestic bank
deposits minus domestic loans (dotted line), both measured as a share of GDP. Source:
CSY, various issues.
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Figure 5: The gure shows savings and investment rates broken down on household,
government, and corporate sector, all expressed as shares of GDP. Source: Yang (2012)
and CSY (various issues).
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Figure 6: The gure illustrates the equilibrium in Yikai Wang (2013).
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